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1. Introduction
An old German saying, which is originally attributed to Wladimir Iljitsch Lenin,
quotes: “Vertrauen ist gut, Kontrolle ist besser” (trust is good, control is better)
(Klosa et al. 1998: 766). Agency Theory assumes that its actors follow this principle.
The agent is opportunistic and selfish and the principal can therefore not trust her.
Unable to oversee all actions the agent takes, due to a high workload or task
complexity, the principal still needs to delegate tasks and substantial deci-
sion-making power to her agent. The control that is lost in this process is recaptured
by the use of monitoring and incentive mechanisms. 
On the other hand the social capital literature continuously emphasizes the positive
impact of mutual trust within societies. Numerous large-scale sociological studies
show that trust levels greatly vary throughout the world. Examining more and less
trustful societies, scholars find untold positive effects of trusting behavior at micro-
and macroeconomic level. Examples of those effects are higher income growth rates,
better tax compliance or less corruption in trustful environments. Trust shows a
strong impact particularly with regard to economic exchanges that require credible
commitment. 
If commitment of agents is not credible it can to a certain degree be replaced by
control. This thesis  assumes that trust can widdershins also replace control and that
it hence has a positive impact on agency problems. It expects trust to decrease
control and to hereby significantly lower the 'control costs' that arise in situations in
which agents are employed. To test this assumption, it firstly further defines what is
referred to as 'control costs' here (section 2.1 and 2.2). Falling back to Agency
Theory, it argues that the (monitoring) expenses caused by audit fees and variable
management remuneration are examples of these 'control costs'. It finds that both,
audit fees and remuneration are subject to an ever more similar regulatory environ-
ment within the European Union (EU). 
With this knowledge, audit fees and variable management remuneration in 119
companies from four European countries with very different trust levels (France,
Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom) are then examined (section 4.3 and 5). This
study finds that the proxies for 'control costs', audit fees and the variable fraction of
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remuneration, are indeed higher in low-trust environments. Running two multivariate
linear regressions, which take advantage of the harmonized regulatory environment
within the EU, the paper concludes that trust apparently has a diminishing effect on
control and the costs it causes. 
In order to make the research results in section 5 more comprehensive, the quantita-
tive part of this work is accompanied by a very extensive literature review on audit
fees (section 2.3), variable remuneration (section 2.4) and trust (section 3). The liter-
ature review covers threefold: economic theory, former empirical research and
accounting aspects. Section 4 detailedly explains the design of the regression
whereas section 6 discusses the findings and section 7 draws a final conclusion. 
Even though it is limited in scope, the work I present contributes to research inas-
much as it empirically analyzes the aforementioned relations of trust and agency
costs for the first time. Determinants of audit fees and remuneration on the one hand
and effects of trust on economic performance on the other hand have been exten-
sively studied. The overlap of these fields has not really been in the focus of science,
however. Although it has not received much attention, this research area is of great
importance: We confront agency situations every day and they do not only cause
costs in the sphere of multinational enterprises. By delegating tasks and responsibili-
ties to others, non-commercial private actors apply agency and face agency costs as
well. In an ever more diverse environment we are subject to increasing but possibly
unjustified distrust within organizations and society (Mayer et al. 1995: 710) and this
imposes overdrawn 'control costs' on us. Increasing audit and legal fees are just one
indicator for this trend. This study hence sees substantial cost-saving potential in a
“trust is better” approach to social and economic interaction and recommends
further research on the issue of trust formation.
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2. Agency Theory
2.1 Basic Assumptions and Conclusions of Agency Theory
Agency Theory is part of the new institutional economics (NIE). NIE uses concepts
from both, the earlier institutional economics and the neoclassical paradigm. From
the “old” institutional economics, NIE differs inasmuch as it makes use of a set of
neoclassical ideas, such as the self-interested, rational and utility-maximizing indi-
vidual and subsequent distribution and efficiency assumptions (Bardmann 2011:
345). From neoclassical economics NIE differs on the other hand, as – just like the
preceding institutional economics – it explicitly takes into account institutions as
important factors in economic interaction (Bardmann 2011: 335). Ménard and
Shirley (2008: 1) define institutions as “the written and unwritten rules, norms and
constraints that humans devise to reduce uncertainty and control their environment”.
According to their definition, institutions appear in the form of laws, norms of
behavior and beliefs as well as in organizational arrangements, such as markets,
firms and other contractual agreements. Institutions are not static. They represent the
views of a large majorities and thus slowly change over time (Bachmann / Inkpen
2011: 285 f.).
Agency Theory, which was strongly influenced by Michael Jensen and William
Meckling, against this backdrop then analyses the relationship of different actors in
the organizational sphere. It assumes that at some stage of growth of an enterprise the
ownership role and the management function, which are initially both taken by one
single individual (the owner-manager), need to be separated due to a high work load
and task complexity (Jensen / Meckling 1983: 2 f.). 
The basic idea is that holders of tradable securities, the owners or principals of the
company, at that point delegate the exertion of control to professional managers, the
agents. The delegation of control tasks goes hand in hand with a transfer of decision
making power (Marten et al. 2015: 49). Jensen and Meckling (1976: 308), as other
scholars of NIE, presume self-interest and utility maximization for principals and
agents. Especially the agents face a high incentive to cheat on their principals (Greif
1989: 865 f.), as the model also presupposes that the principals are not able to
oversee and evaluate all actions the agents take (Blum et al. 2005: 155). Therefore
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and since the interests of principals and agents frequently differ1, it is highly probable
that agents will not always act in the best interest of their principals (Marten et al.
2015: 49).
As the agents have a fairly high degree of control and can make substantial decisions,
the divergence of interests inside the firm imposes considerable costs on the princi-
pals and agents. These costs are known as agency costs and they can be split up into
three parts: 
(1) monitoring expenditures by the principal,
(2) bonding expenditures by the agent and 
(3) residual loss (Jensen / Meckling 1976: 308). 
Bonding expenditures (2) are costs which occur to the agents if they enter certain
agreements in order to signal that their actions are in the best interest of the principal.
In practice, these bonding expenditures could be potential contract penalties or
external audits causing additional effort, which agents voluntarily accept (Jensen /
Meckling 1976: 325). As the primary focus of this work lies on costs that share-
holders, i.e. principals, directly bear, bonding costs will not be further discussed here,
though. 
The residual loss (3) on the other hand are any costs that directly arise from the
divergence of the principals and the agents interests: If the agents indeed use the
firm-owned assets for private consumption or shirk their duties, for instance, this
results in lower profits or share rate losses, which are costs the principals eventually
have to bear (Marten et al. 2015: 51). The residual loss is always taken by the princi-
pals (Jensen / Meckling 1976: 308). Therefore, the principals are prompted to estab-
lish certain measures, which either monitor the work of the management or align the
interests of the agents with their own goals and subsequently lower the residual loss
(ibid.: 323; Schulz 2009: 77 f.). 
Monitoring instruments are the hiring of independent auditors or supervised
restricted budgets, among others (ICAEW 2005: 6 f.). Interest-aligning control mech-
1 Security holders most probably have the goal of profit and equity maximization while the agents, 
maximizing their utility, might also try to minimize their own work effort or privately consume the
firm-owned assets (Miller 2008: 352 f.). Obviously, those goals are conflicting. Also, agents might
have a different attitude towards entrepreneurial risk as they just manage and do not own the firm 
(Beccera / Gupta 1999: 184).
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anisms could in practice be variable management remuneration or the division of the
company into profit centers (Blum et al. 2005: 155; Köster 2013: rec. 3). Commonly,
monitoring and interest-alignment are both applied in combination (Miller 2008:
350). All the instruments, however, also create costs, which Agency Theory refers to
as monitoring expenditures (1) (Jensen / Meckling 1976: 308). At this point it is
important to note again that both, the monitoring expenditures and the residual loss
are summands of the total agency costs. Hence, principals will only opt for any
monitoring expenditure if it is lower than or equal to the the residual loss it elimi-
nates (Jensen / Meckling 1976: 323 f.). 
Other scholars argue that the managerial labour market, making managers constantly
worry about their reputation (Fama 1980), and the market for corporate control,
making poorly managed firms an easy target to hostile takeovers (Manne 1965), also
have a confining effect on the residual loss and thus on Agency Costs. These
approaches will not be further examined here, though. 
A main argument of this paper further developed in section 4.1 is the statement, that
populations with high levels of mutual trust suffer less agency costs, precisely lower
monitoring expenditures than populations with low mutual trust. Because of this,
section 2.2 further defines the central variable monitoring expenditures and discusses
how it could be quantified. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 then examine two types of quantifi-
able monitoring expenditures, explain which factors influence them and outline how
they are disclosed and accounted for.
2.2 Monitoring Expenditures
In section one restricted budgets, independent auditors, the establishment of profit
centers and variable management remuneration were named as examples of moni-
toring and incentive mechanisms. These measures all create monitoring expenditures,
but not all of the expenditures can be quantified. Some of the expenditures can be
quantified, but figures which help to estimate them are regularly not disclosed by
companies (Baetge et al. 2014: 6). The only monitoring expenditures which are both,
quantifiable and widely accessible and therefore of use for our model are firstly fees
independent auditors receive for financial statement audits and secondly the variable
part of the compensation of managers. As this study will detailedly outline in 2.3 and
2.4, those two expenditures are accounted for in bookkeeping departments and they
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